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THE AIR TERVINAL ZONE: INCONSISTENT
REGULATION
DONALD F. WISEMAN*

N THE HISTORY of interstate air cargo transportation few
areas have presented as significant a problem of jurisdiction
and enforcement as the "incidental-to-air" exemption of the Interstate Commerce Act.1
I.

HISTORY

As a general rule, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC,
also referred to as "the Commission") has jurisdiction to engage
in economic regulation of interstate motor transportation unless a
specific statutory exemption exists.' One such exemption is contained in section 10526(a) (8) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
which exempts the motor transportation of property and passengers
which are "incidental to transportation by aircraft."' The exemption was added to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1938 by section 1107(j) of the Civil Aeronautics Act." Since that time, the
question of the appropriate scope of incidental motor transportation, and the issue of whether the ICC or the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB, also referred to as "the Board") is the proper agency
* B.A., 1968, University of Virginia, J.D., 1976, Memphis State University
School of Law; formerly with the department of Legal and Regulatory Affairs,
Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee; currently associated with the
firm of Waring, Cox, Sklar, Allen, Chafetz and Watson of Memphis, Tennessee,
general counsel to Federal Express Corporation.
1 Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 10101-11916, 92 Stat. 1337
(1978) (to be codified in49 U.S.C. § 10101-11916).
2The ICC has jurisdiction over interstate "transportation by motor carrier
and the procurement of that transportation . . ." subject to the exemptions set

forth in sections 10522-10526 of the Act. Id. at § 10521.
31d. at § 10526(a)(8).
4 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1027 (1938) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)).
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to define the scope of the exemption has existed.' Administrative
cases and regulations adopted by both agencies have repeatedly
confused the situation. A recent rulemaking action by the Interstate Commerce Commission and recent legislative amendments
to the Federal Aviation Act have exacerbated the problem to the
point where a congressional resolution is required.
The root cause of the confusion lies in the failure of the ICC
to adopt a functional, rather than geographical definition of "incidental-to-air." The ICC has failed to recognize the distinction, and
as a result, its regulations have resulted in a barrier to efficient air
cargo transportation within the United States. Rather than determine what is incidental with reference to operationalcharacteristics,
the Commission has steadfastly through the years attempted to
define the size of an air carrier's terminal area (the "air terminal
zone"), and in doing so, has mistakenly applied traditional standards of motor carrier regulation which are wholly inappropriate
to air transportation. In addition, the enactment of two recent
pieces of legislation deregulating air transportation has had a profound effect upon the air transportation industry and the scope of
the exemption.! Not only has the ICC failed to recognize the effect
of the legislation, but it is attempting to assert a form of regulation over the incidental transportation activities of air carriers that
is inconsistent with the recent legislation and current economic
thinking on government regulation of business.
There is little legislative history to determine Congress' intent
in enacting the incidental-to-air exemption.! It makes sense to
infer that by enacting the exemption as a part of the Civil Aeronautics Act, Congress intended but one agency, the CAB, to have
5 Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 739, as amended,
49 U.S.C. 51 1301-1542 (1976), required tariffs to be filed with the CAB for
all services in connection with air transportation. Section 101(21)(c), to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24), of the same act defines "interstate air transportation" as commerce which "moves wholly by aircraft or partly by aircraft and

partly by other forms of transportation." The ICC had based its competing
claim of jurisdiction on the Interstate Commerce Act, supra note 1.
I Federal Aviation Act of 1958-Insurance Risks, Pub. L. No. 95-163, §§
17, 18, 91 Stat. 1284-86 (1977) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371, 1386, 1388,
1482); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (effective Oct. 24, 1978) (amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)).
7 Sky Freight Delivery Serv., Inc.-Common Carrier Application, 47 M.C.C.
229, 239 (1947); Sutherlund & Peavy, The Incidental-to-Air 'Exemption: Conflict
and Confusion, 1 TRnNSP. L.J. 87, 88 (1969).
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jurisdiction over such activity. The limited case law that has developed since 1938, however, has held to the contrary. However,
the rationale of the early cases used to define the exemption is no
longer appropriate, since past circumstances in the field of air
freight no longer exist.
When the first incidental-to-air cases were decided in the 1940's,
air freight was in its infancy. Few, if any, air carriers offered their
own incidental pickup and delivery services, instead preferring to
rely on local motor carriers, whether regulated or unregulated.
Air carriers engaged exclusively in all-cargo operations were the
exception rather than the rule, and the Federal Aviation Act did
not distinguish between cargo and passenger service for certification
purposes As a result, industry and government (particularly the
ICC and the regulated motor carrier industry) failed to properly
view incidental-to-air operations as "air transportation." Instead of
one true origin-to-destination movement, they envisioned two separate legs with separate regulatory characteristics.
In 1979, the situation is drastically different. All-cargo air transportation is an established and growing segment of the nation's
transportation system. The rapid growth of the overnight door-todoor small package air transportation system, pioneered by Federal
Express, has established the need for a unitary regulatory scheme
instead of an anachronistic two-agency bureaucracy.! In addition,
all-cargo air carriage has been effectively deregulated, leaving but
one loose end in the Interstate Commerce Act: the incidental-toair exemption.
Although there were at least two prior cases, " Sky Freight Delivery Service, Inc.-Common Carrier Application" was the first
complete discussion by the Interstate Commerce Commission of
the scope of the incidental-to-air exemption. The Commission
' A separate class of all-cargo carriers was not designated until the passage
of Pub. L. No. 95-163, supra note 6, although early all-cargo carriers possessed
certificates, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5 1371 (1976), restricting them to transportation of property.
' For example, during fiscal year 1974 Federal Express had an average daily
package volume of 4,110 pieces. On May 31, 1979, daily volume had approached
60,000 pieces; by October 1, 1979, daily volume approached 70,000 pieces.
"Railway

Express Agency, Inc., Extension of Operations-West Warwick,

R.I., 31 M.C.C. 332 (1941); Railway Express Agency, Inc., Extension of Opera-

tions-Bristol, R.I., 31 M.C.C. 385 (1941).
"147 M.C.C. 229 (1947).
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noted that "the same factors which prompt the use of air-freight
service in the first instance would likewise require that such traffic
ordinarily move from and to the nearest airport and will [thus]
tend to minimize the distance involved in 'incidental-to-air' motor
hauls."1" Although the Commission would not until later describe
these factors as "self-limiting" with respect to the exemption, it
recognized that there are certain inherent characteristics of air
freight that separate it from traditional motor carriage. The Commission initially defined "incidental" in its generally accepted lay
meaning of "occurring in the course of or coming as a result or
an adjunct of something else; . . . foreign or subordinate to the
general purpose."'" It said, "Although we are not slavishly bound
by dictionary definitions, . . . we find no difficulty in accepting it
here.""' Unfortunately, the Commission never again adhered to
this initial line of thinking.
The error begun here by the Commission and compounded
through years of decisions is the conclusion that incidental transportation is that which is "collection, delivery, or interline transfer
of air freight within what appears to be a reasonable terminal area
for the line-haul carrier ..
"" In arriving at this conclusion, the
Commission discussed what it believed to be an appropriate analogy
between the incidental-to-air exemption and section 202(c) (1) and
(2) [now section 10523 (a)] of the Interstate Commerce Act which
provided for the exemption of certain incidental transportation of
motor carriers." In a statement, the philosophy of which has been
honored less by its observance than its breach in cases since Sky
Freight, the Commission stated, "It is readily conceivable, indeed
probable, in view of the radical difference in the character of the
services involved that a permissible terminal area of an air carrier
within which 'incidental' collection, delivery or transfer of services
may be performed may be greater than the maximum permissible
terminal area of a freight forwarder at the same point.'.
With the dramatic rise in cargo transportation the Commission
".

2 Id. at 240.
1 Id. at 241.
14

Id.

fId.

1oId.

1i Id. at 242.
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has tended less often to consider this statement and more often
to consider a protectionist philosophy applied in favor of its regulated carriers. As a result, the Commission has found it necessary
to impose an artificial mileage limitation by defining the exemption in terms that are not suggested by the language of the exemption.
In 1948, the Commission decided Peoples Express Co. Extension of Operation-Air Freight,"s which expanded Sky Freight
to the extent that it attempted to define at least what is not
incidental-to-air transportation by describing what is thought to
be "connecting-carrier line-haul service.""' ' Essentially the case
stands for the proposition that motor operations extending so far
as to reach into the territory which is adjacent to, and served
primarily by, another airport clearly take on the character of
inter-terminal line-haul service in substitution for rather than incidental to, air transportation. Once again the Commission superimposed a requirement that has no relation to the characteristics
of air transportation. It is this mistaken adherence to the idea of
"size" that has been the source of all the subsequent problems between the Commission, the motor carriers, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the air carriers."
In 1953 the Commission concluded a rather extensive investigation which resulted in a lengthy opinion entitled Hazel Kenny
Extension-Air Freight,'1 which discussed the incidental-to-air exemption in great detail. Kenny formed the basis for all subsequent
case decisions until its eventual codification into the Commission's
regulations.' The Kenny case was the first to recognize the corresponding role of the Civil Aeronautics Board in determining the
scope of regulations that deal with operations "in connection
with air transportation" in accordance with what at that time
was the Civil Aeronautics Act.' The exemption was defined as
1848 M.C.C. 393 (1948).

19Id. at 395.
11The Commission's decision in Graff Common Carrier Application, 48
M.C.C. 310 (1948), illustrates the inconsistency. In the Graft case, inter-terminal
movements were approved under certain conditions. Id.
2161 M.C.C. 587 (1953).

"See Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71 (1964).
261 M.C.C. at 594.
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"that confined to the transportation in bona fide collection, delivery or transfer service of shipments which have been received
from, or will be delivered to, an air carrier as part of a continuous movement under a through air bill of lading covering
in addition to the line-haul movement by air the collection, delivery, or transfer service performed by motor carrier."' It also
reaffirmed the idea that the services would be performed within a
"reasonable terminal area of the air carrier" and that they would
not have the characteristics of "connecting-carrier line-haul service. ' Echoing the previous statements in Sky Freight, the Commission thought that such a test would be self-limiting because it
would be impossible for carriers or their agents to hold themselves
out as offering true air freight service with its attendant necessity
for speed, and at the same time engage in otherwise prohibited linehaul service.
The Kenny decision recognized that the limits of the air terminal
area were defined by the air carriers themselves in tariffs filed with
the Civil Aeronautics Board. As long as the Commission believed
that the Civil Aeronautics Board would be reasonably restrictive
in the acceptance of such tariffs, it was content to assume that the
"agency would not hesitate to reject any publication which would
result in an unreasonable enlargement of such an area. '
1I. CAB

AND

ICC

RULEMAKING OF

1964

Cases were considered on an ad hoc basis with varying results
until the 1960's when air transportation became a more important
transportation factor." In 1961, both the ICC and the CAB instituted, on their own motions, rulemaking proceedings to determine
the scope of the incidental-to-air exemption.'
Although the ICC investigation was instituted on the Commis4

2

Id. at 595.

z Id.
2

6 Id.

2

at 596.

'See, e.g., Commodity Haulage Corp., Common Carrier Application, 69
M.C.C. 527 (1947); Fisher, Common Carrier Application, 83 M.C.C. 229 (1960).
28 Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft,
ICC Docket No. MC-C-3437, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 Fed. Reg.
9569 (1961); Part 222-Tariffs of Air Carriers, Air Cargo Pick-up and Delivery
Zones, CAB Docket No. 12951, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 Fed. Reg.
8037 (1961).
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sion's own motion, it was prompted by the filing of joint petitions
by five motor carrier trade associations (including the American
Trucking Association) and forty individual carriers. 9 The motor
carriers sought to limit the scope of exempt transportation to thwart
what they perceived to be a threat to their economic stability.
Several positions were put forward by different parties in the case
including a "length of line haul" test or a simple "prior or subsequent movement" test, both of which were rejected by the Commission.' The Commission reaffirmed its previous Kenny holding"
and proceeded to codify it in regulations which are substantially
in existence to date.' Although the Commission stated that the
"imposition of a definite mileage limitation is unnecessary,"' it
is clear from subsequent events that the Commission's reliance upon
what it believed to be a restrictive practice of the Civil Aeronautics
Board did in fact impose an arbitrary mileage limitation. Consequently, incidental-to-air was defined with respect to the size of a
terminal area and not to the functional characteristics of the incidental transportation being performed. In addition, the Commission decision established the veto authority of the ICC over the
CAB's decision concerning pickup and delivery points.'
The CAB's concurrent rulemaking proceeding resulted in the
adoption of Part 222 of the Board's regulations.' The rules provided for a terminal zone defined by a "rule of thumb" radius of
twenty-five miles from either the airport or from the corporate
limits of the city served by the airport." In addition, a provision
was included for ad hoc extensions of the rule upon application to
the Board, supported by adequate economic evidence.'
The CAB's standards, however, differed somewhat from those
of the ICC. The Board thought that true air cargo pickup and
delivery service depended upon the type of equipment used, whether
29 Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft,
95 M.C.C. 71, 72 (1964).

3Id. at 86.

31
Id. at 94.
3249 C.F.R. § 1047.40 (1978).

"95 M.C.C. at 85.
4Id. at 87.
"14 C.F.R. § 222 (1979).
3Id.

3714 C.F.R. § 222.3 (1979).
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or not the service was geared to meet airline schedules, and whether
or not the service was oriented to customer air transportation
needs." The Board believed that:
[T]he full development of air cargo transportation depends, in
large measure, upon efficient surface transportation; effective customer-oriented pickup and delivery service can best be guaranteed when it is under the control of the direct air carrier or the air
freight forwarder; this control can be maintained by the operation
of trucks directly by the air carrier and the air freight forwarder
or under contract with local cartage agents; and a reasonable
amount of freedom for the direct air carriers and air freight forwarders to establish pickup and delivery service and to test their
adequacy and economy is vital to prevent a stifling of the potential
of the air cargo transportation.'
Although the twenty-five mile "rule of thumb" provided a workable yardstick for day-to-day air carrier operations, Part 222 generally was not applied by the Board in a restrictive fashion.'
In each order authorizing a carrier to file tariffs with extended
pickup and delivery points, the CAB consistently adhered to
the functional characteristics first enunciated in the preamble to
Part 222: the type of equipment used, compatibility with aircraft
schedules, and an orientation to specific air transportation needs.
The CAB correctly did not consider any geographical, political,
economic or commercial factors which govern the ICC's idea of a
motor carrier's "terminal area.'"' Thus, by not trapping itself into
a mistaken concept of "reasonable size" the CAB was able to
consistently keep its eye on the true functional determinants of the
incidental-to-air exemption.
a' Part 222-Air Cargo Pick-up and Delivery Zones; Filing of Tariffs: Applications for Authority to File, Preamble to Regulations, CAB Docket No. 12951,
29 Fed. Reg. 6275 (1964).
39Id.
4' See, e.g., Emery Air Freight Corp., Order Authorizing Filing of Pick-up
and Delivery Tariffs, CAB Order No. 78-6-55 (June 8, 1978); Profit-by-Air, Inc.,
Order Authorizing Filing of Pick-up and Delivery Tariffs, CAB Orders No.
78-9-80 (Sept. 18, 1978) and 78-12-55 (Dec. 7, 1978). The Board has consistently held that public necessity is not a factor, that intermediate points are
facie includable, and that overlapping terminal areas are not a factor. Id.
prima
41
See, e.g., Emery Air Freight Corp., Order Authorizing Filing of Pick-up
and Delivery Tariffs, CAB Order No. 78-6-55 (June 8, 1978); Profit-by-Air,
Inc., Order Authorizing Filing of Pick-up and Delivery Tariffs, CAB Orders No.
78-9-80 (Sept. 18, 1978) and 78-12-55 (Dec. 7, 1978). See also Sutherlund &
Peavy, supra note 7, at 99 n.60.
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III. POST-1964 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Of the ICC decisions after the 1964 rulemaking, two have had
particular significance and illustrate the Commission's position
from the standpoint of protecting its economically regulated motor
carriers. In Zantop Air Transport, Inc.-Investigation of Operations,' the ICC investigated the operations of Zantop Air Transport, an all-cargo direct air carrier. Zantop was using its own
trucks to transport the shipments of its customers between
Wilmington, Delaware and the Baltimore, Maryland airport, a distance well in excess of the twenty-five mile rule of thumb. Each shipment had a prior or subsequent movement by air. Instead of examining the functional characteristics of the motor leg, the ICC held that
Baltimore was not the airport "designated by the CAB to serve Wilmington." Thus, Zantop was found to have engaged in "intercommunity line-haul service" and the services of a certificated motor
carrier were required. ' Although the Commission did not explain
what "designated" meant, it did cite its own Commercial Zones
and Terminal Areas" case as being a "kindred" concept and
authority for the (unstated) proposition that an air carrier's terminal area must be determined with reference to the same factors that
are determinative of a motor carrier's terminal area. ' The Commission seemed confused that Zantop did not file tariffs with the
CAB, but that confusion did not deter its "apples and oranges"
comparison. In a well-reasoned dissent, Chairman Bush recognized
the factors peculiar to air transportation. He expressed his belief
that any motor movement with such characteristics was not only
truly incidental, but when such transportation is performed by the
carrier,it is exempt as a matter of law.'
Zantop appealed," and in an opinion substantially devoid of
citations, the ICC's order was affirmed as being supported by substantial evidence.' The "substantial" evidence consisted of a letter
"102

M.C.C. 457 (1966).

Id. at 462.
-"54 M.C.C. 21 (1952).
"102 M.C.C. at 461.
id. at 467.
47Zantop Air Transp., Inc. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Mich.
1967).

11 Id. at 267.
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from the ICC's assistant general counsel to the court describing
the Commission's findings."' Although the ICC had once again
applied the inappropriate motor carrier commercial zone and
terminal area standard, the Michigan district court affirmed the
order.'
The second significant post-1964 decision was the second Incidental-to-Air investigation of 1970." At the insistence of several
regulated motor carriers, the ICC undertook an investigation of the
air terminal zones at Indianapolis, Indiana and Atlanta, Georgia,
after the CAB had authorized the filing of tariffs with it that
effectively expanded both of those zones. The Commission once
again considered the terminal areas of other modes of transportation to be analogous, including the concept of "community homogeneity."'" The ICC effectively overruled the CAB and returned
the terminal zones of the two cities to a smaller area.
The reason for the decision was, as might be expected, the protection of existing regulated motor carriers.' The sentiment was
certainly not new, but, as noted before, there had previously been
little alarm when the CAB had consistently adhered to the twentyfive mile rule of thumb. It was only when the Commission's regulated motor carriers were faced with a possible "unbridled expansion" of exempt transportation that the ICC vigorously asserted its
claim to primary jurisdiction." Adequacy of existing service, however, has little, if any, relevance to the determination of what is
incidental-to-air transportation.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW

As noted, the CAB is authorized to determine what is "in connection with air transportation."" Prior to the 1964 rulemaking
by both agencies, the CAB's authority in this regard was affirmed
Id. at 266, 267-68.
50 Id. at 267.
"5Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft,
112 M.C.C. 1 (1970).
" Id. at 14, 17-22.
53 Id. at 16-17, 22.
1Id. at 16. See also Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 95 M.C.C. 71, 86 (1964).
4'

"112

M.C.C. at 16.

"'See note 5 supra.
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in City of Philadelphiav. Civil Aeronautics Board.' This seminal
case distinguishes the authority available to both the ICC and the
CAB, although it upholds the principle that "air transportation"
includes not only aircraft flights but also incidental motor transportation."
After the 1964 rulemaking, the ICC's action was challenged in
Air Dispatch, Inc. v. United States" with the petitioners relying on
City of Philadelphiafor the proposition that the ICC did not have
the authority to promulgate regulations concerning the reasonableness of an air carrier's terminal area.' The court held that the ICC
has the jurisdiction to define the scope of the exemption granted
in section 203(b) (7a) [now section 10526(a) (8)] of the Interstate Commerce Act." In distinguishing City of Philadelphia,the
court noted that the CAB had "disclaimed" jurisdiction in favor of
the ICC' Two factors led to the judicial approval of a regulatory
system that is no longer appropriate: 1 ) the court's view that there
are air carriers with their regulatory scheme on the one hand, and
motor carriers performing the incidental service with their regulatory scheme on the other hand; and 2) the CAB's disclaimer of
jurisdiction. Today, neither of these factors exists. No one, except
the regulated motor carriers, can now argue that air transportation
involving a subordinate incidental pickup and delivery operation is
separate line-haul motor transportation. Additionally, in documents recently filed with the ICC, the CAB has disclaimed its previous disclaimer of jurisdiction.'
Two other cases on the same issue followed shortly, both holding in favor of the ICC's jurisdiction and relying entirely on Air
57289 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In this case the motor leg was between
Philadelphia, Pa. and Newark, N.J., a distance of 90 miles. Id. at 771.

"Id. at 774.
"237
60

F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 381 U.S. 412 (1965).

Id. at 453.

61 Id.

Id. CAB orders granting authority to file pickup and delivery tariffs to
points beyond the 25-mile rule of thumb have routinely stated that the order is
not to reflect on whether the applicant may require further authority from the
ICC or any other agency. See note 40 supra.

11 Initial Comments of the Civil Aeronautics Board filed in ICC Docket No.
MC-C-3437 (Sept. 1977) suggested that all such authority be returned to the
CAB. In addition the CAB filed a Petition for Reconsideration in the same docket

which objected to the ICC's assertion of authority.
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Dispatch with little discussion.' Subsequent cases have dealt with
more limited issues concerning particular carriers. These administrative decisions have been routinely affirmed."'
V. THE ICC's RECENT RULEMAKING AND THE EFFECT
OF AIR CARRIER DEREGULATION LEGISLATION

Until the ICC instituted its recent rulemaking proceeding, the
state of regulatory affairs was that motor transportation of property
would be found to be exempt when the following conditions were
met:
1. The transportation must be within the terminal area of an air
carrier (generally twenty-five miles from the airport or airport
city limits or approved extensions).
2. The transportation must be described in a tariff on file with
the CAB.
3. The goods must move on a through air bill of lading covering
the line-haul by air and the incidental collection, delivery or
transfer service.
4. Points beyond twenty-five miles must have been approved by
the CAB.
In addition, the terminal area must be "reasonable" as tested by the
twenty-five mile rule of thumb and the "community homogeneity"
standard with the ICC asserting a veto power.
On May 25, 1977, the ICC instituted a proceeding to determine "whether the area (the 'air terminal area') within which
motor transportation of property and passengers incidental to
transportation by aircraft is exempt from economic regulation
under the Interstate Commerce Act should be redefined and expanded."'6 The Commission initially proposed consideration of a
radius of up to one hundred miles from the airport and retention
of the reference to air carrier tariffs on file with the CAB." Comments were received from numerous interested parties, and an informal conference was held on December 14, 1977, with more
"4Wycoff Co. v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 304, 309 (D. Utah 1965); National Bus Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 869, 871 (N.D. I11. 1965).
"See, e.g., Zantop Air Transp., Inc. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.
Mich. 1967); ICC v. Howard, 342 F. Supp. 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1972), afl'd, 477
F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1973).
6042 Fed. Reg. 26,667 (1977).
67 Id.
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than a hundred participants. The two rounds of comments that
were eventually received by the Commission ranged from proposals for a roll-back of the exempt zone (by the regulated carriers)
to proposals for relatively unlimited exempt transportation (by the
all-cargo air carriers, air freight forwarders, Department of Transportation, and Department of Justice). In order to further develop
the record, the ICC's Bureau of Economics was directed to develop
a study of incidental-to-air transportation. Its report concluded that
the terminal zones should be a thirty-five mile radius measured from
the airport or the airport city, but that a one hundred mile radius
was too broad."
The comments filed by the CAB are extremely significant from
a jurisdictional point of view because they represent a reassertion
of its previously "disclaimed" jurisdiction."' In reasserting its belief that it should be the proper arbiter of incidental-to-air questions, the CAB removed one of the bases upon which Air Dispatchm
was decided.
On January 11, 1979, the ICC released its Final Decision and
Rules, to become effective May 16, 1979."' It found that a reasonable air terminal area was one that extended thirty-five miles from
the airport and thirty-five miles from the corporate limits of any
municipality, any part of whose commercial zone intersected the
radius drawn from the airport. In other words, a minimum seventymile radius was described for the majority of points in the United
States. More importantly, the new rule provided that extensions of
the zone would be granted only after application to the ICC rather
than the CAB. This effectively repealed the operation of the CAB's
fifteen-year-old Part 222 without any action by that agency." All
references to CAB tariffs were also deleted. "' The Commission reaffirmed the principles contained in Kenny and the earlier Inci68 Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Economics, Air Terminal
Exempt Zones and the Intermodal Movement of Air Cargo 40-41 (1978).
61 Initial Comments of the CAB, supra note 63, at 3.
10237 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1964), afl'd per curiam, 381 U.S. 412 (1965).
71 Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft,
131 M.C.C. 87 (1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 3295 (1979), reissued, 44 Fed. Reg. 6102
(1979).
72

131 M.C.C. at 97-98.

71Id. The CAB had recently issued Part 291 of its Regulations, exempting

cargo carriers from filing tariffs. Regulation ER-1080, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,139
(1978), reissued, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,628 (1978).
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dental-to-Air decisions, even though the application of those principles was substantially changed. The primary difference, and one
which was not discussed by the Commission, was that the ICC was
now relying on an arbitrary mileage factor whereas all previous
cases had at least paid lip service to the view that no mileage limitation was necessary.
In the year and a half between the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the issuance of the Final Rule, two extremely important legislative changes were made to the Federal Aviation Act.
The first enactment removed almost all traditional economic regulation from all-cargo air carriers, including all route and most rate
regulation.' The second was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
which partially deregulated the air transportation of passengers,
and provided for the eventual phasing out of the CAB entirely by
1985.7"
The policy sections of these statutes represent clear expressions
by Congress that air transportation in general, and all-cargo air
transportation in particular, are to be removed from all forms of
economic regulation and that free market forces are to be the
determinant of the "where, when and how much" of service. Section 101 (21) (c) of the Federal Aviation Act, which defines "interstate air transportation" as commerce which moves "partly by aircraft and partly by other forms of air transportation,""0 makes it
clear that incidental motor transportation of property is as much a
part of air transportation as the line-haul by air.
The greatest effect of cargo deregulation is to vitiate the ICC's
reliance on the concept of a "reasonable terminal area measured
from designated airports" by removing all air carrier route restrictions. An air carrier may now serve any community from any
airport it chooses. Any concept based on "community homogeneity," therefore, is no longer appropriate. The ICC's arbitrary
restriction based on geographic size instead of functional character' Federal Aviation Act of 1958-Insurance Risks, Pub. L. No. 95-163,
18, 91 Stat. 1286 (1977) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1002).
' Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)).
76
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(21)(c), 72 Stat.
739 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (24) (Supp. 1979)); Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (to be
codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1302).
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istics is directly at odds with this statutory scheme.
Unfortunately, in its 1979 rule, the ICC failed to recognize the
effect of all-cargo deregulation. It saw in deregulation, not a directive to cease regulation, but "a good deal of uncertainty" that required that its regulations "set forth on their face the exact scope
of the exemption.". It found itself unable to abandon traditional
notions of protection of economic monopoly when it stated: "[W]e
have afforded regulated carriers a certain measure of economic
protection by insuring that exempt operations do not assume the
character of connecting carrier line-haul service.""m
The CAB filed a Petition for Reconsideration, along with others,
pointing out to the ICC that it had failed to consider these legislative pronouncements and that in doing so, it was acting in direct
conflict with congressional policy prescriptions. In addition, the
CAB objected to the ICC's apparent attempt to prescribe the jurisdiction of the CAB:
In attempting to remove the CAB from the decisional process, we
believe that the ICC may have overstepped its statutory authority,
and we regret the uncertainty that such action may create. The
Commission offers no justification and cites no authority to support its allegation .

.

.that 'of the several governmental entities

involved in the regulation of transportation this Commission alone
is charged with the duty to consider all modes in the exercise of
its regulatory functions and not only those modes subject to the
express provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.' 9
Thus, the CAB's views on jurisdiction and the definition of exempt
incidental-to-air transportation have changed since its "disclaimers"
of 1961 and 1964.
At literally the eleventh hour before the ICC's rules were to become effective, they were stayed by order of the Commission."9 Two
weeks later, however, the Commission lifted its stay, ordered the
rules effective June 26, 1979, and denied all petitions for reconsideration."
7

131 M.C.C. at 97.

'8Id.

" Civil Aeronautics Board, Petition for Reconsideration, at 3 n.9, MC-C-3437,
filed with the ICC on February 9, 1979.
80ICC Order, Docket No. MC-C-3437 (May 15, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 33,684
(1979).
11ICC Order, Docket No. MC-C-3437, decision and order filed May 30,
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The final ICC decision was important in three respects: it
affirmed its previous assertion of supreme authority over incidentalto-air questions;"2 it admitted that the decision was partly based
upon a desire to protect economically regulated motor carriers;"
and it took the last step in the transition from the functional definition in the early cases to an arbitrary, and unsupportable, standard based on geographic size. Evidence of the Commission's continued insistence on such an arbitrary standard is contained in its
statement concerning the hypothetical case at the outer edge of the
air terminal zone where it bisects a municipality. In its Petition for
Reconsideration, Federal Express noted that in such a circumstance
shippers on one side of a street could receive service, while a
shipper on the other side of the street could not. In its final decision, the Commission brushed aside this point by saying that service to any portion of such a municipality was "simply a fortuitous
circumstance."" Such a statement clearly indicates the final abandonment of any attempt to define "incidental" by its functional
characteristics and further indicates failure by the Commission to
consider the economically discriminatory effect of such an arbitrary
position. Although an optimistic reading of the decision indicates
that the Commission will continue to reassess the 35-35 formula
with a view toward broadening it, no assurances as to that possibility can be given.
VI.

THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The ICC has now cemented its idea of geographic size and
supreme agency authority into regulations. The CAB has effectively been removed from the regulatory decision-making process,
and the cooperative effort that had existed between the two agencies since 1964 has been extinguished. This regulatory anomaly
has created a pressing need for congressional action. It is clear
that the ICC intends to impose a form of regulation over bona fide
incidental pickup and delivery operations of air carriers. The Com1979 (unreported). A Petition for Review is pending in the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Air Delivery Serv. v. ICC, No. 79-1253 (D.C. Cir.,
filed Mar. 6, 1979).
82
ICC Order, Docket No. MC-C-3437, supra note 81, at 5.
'3

id. at 7.

"Id.

1980]

AIR TERMINAL ZONES

mission's decision makes it clear that one of its aims is to protect
its regulated motor carriers, an aim that is inconsistent with
congressionally mandated air carrier deregulation. If adequacy of
existing service was ever a proper determinant of incidental-to-air
transportation, there can be no doubt but that the recent deregulation statute has effectively removed it from consideration.
Although the legislative amendments to the Federal Aviation Act
and the CAB's objection to the ICC's unilateral action have removed the underlying principles of the Air Dispatch case and the
Incidental-to-Air case, the Commission has failed to reconsider its
decision. An amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, clearly
defining the exemption in terms of the service being provided, not
in terms of geographic size, is clearly needed. Such an amendment
should provide that any property moving on a through air bill of
lading issued by an air carrier is exempt from ICC regulation when
the transportation is being performed by the air carrier, as long
as it has a prior or subsequent movement by air, regardless of
the type or size vehicle used, the type or weight of commodities
carried, or the distance from the origin or destination to the point
where the aircraft is met.
On June 21, 1979, the President transmitted to Congress a package of legislation designed to substantially reduce government
economic regulation of the trucking industry." In addition to a
number of other badly-needed reforms, the proposed Trucking
Competition and Safety Act of 1979 would amend the present
air cargo exemption to read as follows:
(8) transportation by motor vehicle of property as part of a continuous movement which, prior or subsequent thereto, has been
or will be transported by an air carrier subject to regulation under
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958; or, to the extent so agreed by
the United States, by a foreign air carrier subject to regulation
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."
This amendment adopts the simple "prior or subsequent" test to
determine eligibility for the exemption. It is a pure functional test
8S. 1400, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4586, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 4549, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4550, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
8S. 1400, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 112, 125 CONG. REC. S8,420 (daily ed. June
25, 1979).
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that recognizes the purpose and intent of previous air cargo deregulation policy and satisfies the needs identified above.
There can be little doubt of the need for such legislation. Present
regulations discriminate against a shipper unfortunate enough to
be located outside the ICC's idea of a "reasonable" terminal area.
They impose an additional cost on the shipper in terms of convenience and cause the transportation rates to be higher than necessary. The chance of loss or damage is also increased since the air
carrier must relinquish possession of the property to a motor carrier for a portion of its journey. More importantly, the rules are
out of step with current concepts of economic regulation and are
inconsistent with the recent policy statements of Congress as expressed in the 1977 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act and
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
Only through the enactment of such an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act can the full promise of air transportation be
fulfilled. As the ICC said years ago in Kenny, the concept really is
"self-limiting."'" True incidental pickup and delivery can never be
a substitute for air transportation because such a substitution violates the very premise upon which air transportation is basedspeed.

" Hazel Kenny Extension-Air Freight, 61 M.C.C. 587, 595 (1953).

